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We are the mirror as well as the face in it. 
We are tasting the taste this minute 
of eternity. We are pain 
and what cures pain, both. We are 
the sweet cold water and the jar that pours. 
Rumi 
SUMMARY 
The paper tries to tackle the question of connection between entropy and the living. Definitions of life 
as the phenomenon that defies entropy are overviewed and the conclusion is reached that life is in a 
way dependant on entropy – it couldn't exist without it. Entropy is a sort of medium, a fertile soil, that 
gives life possibility to blossom. Paper ends with presenting some consequences for the field of 
artificial intelligence. 
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WHAT IS LIFE? 
The aim of the present paper is search for new understanding of the role of entropy in 
connection to life and showing some consequences that arise from this. If I want to reach this 
goal, I have to start by listing some of the most common answers to question “What is life?” 
In searching for the principal, determining characteristic of life we normally tend to slip into 
the enumeration of its vital functions like metabolism, reproduction, growth etc. Karl von 
Frisch's book “Du und das Leben” from the year 1949 is an example of such an approach. 
The deficiencies, or at least borderline cases (crystals, viruses, the planet Earth…), of such 
definitions are not hard to find. Looking for the characteristic functions of living organisms is 
important for medical and some biological purposes, but it does not tell us enough about the 
phenomenon of life itself. 
Maturana and Varela 1 characterise the prevailing attitude of contemporary biology to the 
question of life as a combination of the physical-chemical and evolutionary approach. The 
first one explains biological processes from the point of view of chemical reactions going on 
inside living organisms. It focuses on processes such as cellular respiration and metabolism, 
the synthesis of proteins and also the genetic code, which is supposed to contain all 
information necessary for the synthesis of proteins and for life and the development of the 
organism in general. The second approach explains the emergence of biological processes as 
the result of random variations of the genetic code and natural selection of the phenotypes in 
which the genetic information gets realised. The first line of thought considers its basic 
biological unit to be the gene, for the second one this is the species
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. 
Maturana and Varela 1, 2 do not question the physical-chemical foundation of living 
systems nor their gradual development through continuous interactions with the environment. 
They only doubt that the units of research selected this way (genes, species) could present us 
with a basis for our understanding of what is life in its essence. They claim that the question: 
What do all living systems have in common that makes us classify them as living beings? 
remains unanswered and always tacitly present somewhere in the background, even if most 
biologists tend to avoid it 1; p.74. 
It is interesting that one of the most influential works on the question of life had not been 
written by a biologist but by a physicist. In his book “What is Life?” Erwin Schrödinger 3 
presents a view of life starting from an utterly different perspective from contemporary 
biology. He takes into account the uniform nature of living beings, by which he manages to 
avoid reduction. Schrödinger suggests the following answer to the question: When do we 
consider something to be alive?; 
“When it ΄feeds΄ on negative entropy.” 3; ch.7. 
The theory that living beings create negative entropy (the so-called syntropy or negentropy) 
has been picked up and developed in the last decades by the chemist Ilya Prigogine in his 
concept of dissipative structures (see e.g. 4). A similar conception of the living can also be 
found in the work of one of the forefathers of cybernetics – Heinz von Förster, who compares 
living beings to the Maxwell demon in order to present the idea that living beings are actually 
entropy-retarders. 
It is important to notice that in all the variants of the described theory the basic units of research 
are living beings in their entirety and not just one selected function or process (e.g. reproduction 
or metabolism). If the entropic definition of life is to appear plausible, we cannot consider living 
beings to be closed systems, as in such systems entropy can only grow or remain unchanged. 
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Living beings therefore must be open systems. But despite the fact that they are open, they are 
nevertheless also clearly separated from the environment in some way. This separation is, 
ontologically speaking, much stronger than for example the separation of the dewar (which can 
be considered to be an approximation of a closed system) from its environment. Thus, living 
systems are not closed in terms of the exchange of energy and matter, but they are “closed” in 
terms of preserving their identity. To emphasise these distinctions, Maturana and Varela 
distinguish between structurally and organisationally open or closed systems. Living 
organisms are thus structurally open and organisationally closed systems. 
Schrödinger gave an expanded entropy equation for this kind of systems: dS = deS + diS, 
where dS stands for the entire change of entropy of a living system, deS stands for the flow of 
entropy through the system and diS stands for the production of entropy inside the system due 
to irreversible changes occurring in it. While the diS member is always positive, the deS 
member can also be negative and in its absolute value bigger than diS, meaning that the entire 
change of entropy in an open system can be less than zero. Thus, an open system can change 
in the direction of increased orderliness. Of course, this ordering in open systems feeds on the 
order of the (closed) wider system, which contains these open systems – namely, the 
environment. This containing system still change in the direction of lesser order according to 
the second law of thermodynamics. The increase of entropy represents the flow of entropy 
that has negative value from the point of view of the contained open systems and enables 
them to increase their inner order. 
Under certain circumstances open systems can continuously perform work. For a system to 
be able to do that, it must not be in the state of stable equilibrium, rather, it has to “search” 
for such equilibrium 5. Let us consider Bertalanffy's example of the water reservoir with 
high potential energy: one might open the reservoir and the water would start flowing from it 
in the direction of lower potential energy until it would reach a state in which its potential 
energy could go no lower (the state of stable or at least local equilibrium). In the meantime, it 
could perform some work, for example, it could make a turbine go. But it is obvious that this 
performing could only last for a limited period of time. 
IN WHAT STATE SHOULD A SYSTEM BE IN ORDER TO PERFORM WORK 
CONTINUOUSLY? 
That is the key question. Let me explain why: In the second part of his autobiography Karl 
Popper included a chapter entitled “Conversations with Schrödinger” 6. In this chapter 
Popper challenges Schrödinger's definition of life (that which “feeds” on negative entropy) 
with the claim that also a common oil stove or a self-winding watch can do that. Therefore, 
that cannot be the defining characteristic of life. Schrödinger answers that living beings remain 
in the stationary state of relatively high orderliness (i.e. low entropy) by continuously extracting 
order from the environment (and are thus continuously capable of performing work). 
The realisation that living beings are structurally open systems that can lower their inner 
entropy on the credit of the environment is important, but it is even more important to find 
out how they (we) manage to do that continuously. 
The answer is: Structurally open systems have to search for the state of stable equilibrium, 
but in order to do that they must constantly remain outside that state. The systems succeeding 
in this are far from the so-called thermal equilibrium. The imperfective aspect of the verb “to 
search” implies a major change in our line of thought. We are dealing with systems whose 
goal is not to reach a given state, but to continue searching for such a state. The most 
appropriate way of describing them is perhaps the Zen saying: the path is the goal. In the rest 




The state in which we find structurally open systems capable of continuously performing work 
is called the stationary state. The term “stationary” is perhaps not the most appropriate, since 
the described systems are actually constantly in motion. Stagnation would mark the change of 
their organisation and thus their identity. Naturally, their mobility cannot be of just any kind – it 
has to be regulatory. The characteristic variable (variables) of the system has to be maintained 
inside of given delimitations. Like a rope-walker, who has to keep balancing herself. The 
rope-walker “functions” far from the state of balance – the finding of a balanced position for 
her would mean certain death (or at least unspectacular messing around in the safety net). 
Exactly the same goes for living beings. They need to balance fixation and flexibility. Just as 
adaptation to a given life-space is essential, so is the permanent fluidity. If the system became 
completely fixed, it would not only lose its “stationary” organisation, but it would also 
become unable to preserve its dynamic stability with the environment. The importance of this 
conclusion cannot be overemphasised. I believe that here we touch upon the principal pattern, 
characteristic of living systems. As we can see, the decrease of entropy or the preservation of 
available energy inside the system is not a finite task (one that has a reachable goal). It is vital 
that the system persists in doing this. 
The linear way of thinking that we are used to cannot handle the imperfective aspect of the 
described process very well. If we take it, for example, that “searching” is the essence of the 
described systems, one would imagine a system searching for something and once it finds that 
thing, its task is done. Searching (like all other processes which can be described reasonably 
well) is a linear thing. It is a process with a beginning and an end and a transitory function: from x 
to y, from the problem to the solution. This roughly depicts the view on life (and cognition) 
held by prevailing approaches in artificial intelligence: living beings are supposed to be a type 
of so-called autonomous agents (entities that can solve problems in changing environment). 
But the “searching”2 as described here is intrinsically imperfective. We do not search to find, 
but to keep searching. Once we find it, we are lost. Obviously, the process in question is 
recursive and circular. We seem to have problems with describing it. (Zen koans appear to be 
the most appropriate way of doing this). 
“A MISTAKE IS NOT AN ERROR” [7] 
Before I go on, let me indicate one of the consequences of the described pattern. Pask 
characterises it with the sentence: “A mistake is not an error.” 7. Continuous, self-centred 
“searching” (or “testing”) which enables us (living systems) to survive is also reflected in our 
experiential world. In this perspective, the “imperfections” found in any performing or concept (if 
we only delve deep enough analytically) prove to be necessary. The “fuzziness” of borders, 
indeterminacy and similar “bugs” are not just signs of a momentary incapability or lack of 
precision of the observer (or deficiencies of the theory), but a reflection of the amazing property 
of living (in this case also conscious) beings, which allows them to continuously adapt to a 
changing (entropic!) environment. 
This ability of constant manoeuvring, this continuous search for equilibrium that is an aim in 
itself (I hope that the recursion here is obvious) is called negotiating by Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch 8. The authors believe that this ability of living beings to negotiate their way 
through a world, which is “not pre-given and determined, but constantly formed by a series 
of actions, which we engage in, is a necessary condition for a richly interlaced and 
independent experiential world” 8. 
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LIFE IS A SYSTEM-PROCESS (SYSTEM-PHENOMENON) 
An aeroplane is an aeroplane whether it happens to be flying at the moment of observation or 
not. Similarly, a computer remains a computer also when turned off. The organisation of its 
components, that is, the network of its internal relationships due to which we classify such a 
system as a computer (the identity of the system) is independent of whether the entire system 
is operational (performs certain operations) in a given moment or not. In living systems, the 
situation is completely different
3
. They must function constantly in order to exist. Their identity 
is therefore determined by their functioning or dynamics and not their structure. We can thus 
conclude that existence is the only really important product of the functioning of living beings. 
In order to understand the nature of living systems, we must establish a double view 9, which 
allows us to see the pattern and the components through which it is embodied at the same time. 
Besides, this living system cannot be observed non-temporally – a frozen picture (i.e. only by 
exploring its structure) cannot tell us whether the system in question is indeed alive or not. 
At this point we could ask ourselves: Is life a phenomenon? Is it perhaps a characteristic of a 
system? Or is it a particular kind of dynamics, which can “happen” to a particular type of 
systems? The answer is hard to find, since (in scientific language) there exist no appropriate 
categories for describing such phenomena. Life is a combination of dynamics and entity 
(structure) that changes. It is neither structure nor process, it is structure-process. 
Consciousness is neither body nor mind, it is body-mind. We are dealing here with indivisible 
wholes, composed of two levels: dynamics and structure that gets realised through it. More 
accurately: if we divide them, their essence is lost. 
The scientific language endeavouring to follow as much as possible the ideal of the 
mathematical-logical language, does not include any appropriate structure for dealing with that. 
In logic there exist entities (logical variables), their properties and relations between them. In 
mathematics we find mathematical structures, their properties, relations between these structures 
and an active part in the form of functions. But there is no possibility of describing a 
structure-process. Because of that, the scientific language must necessarily objectify living beings 
(and from here the next step of trivialization is just around the corner). Now we can understand 
why Maturana and Varela felt a need to create a new language 1, which would be capable of 
dealing with circular phenomena (or better structure-phenomena) of the living world. 
Exploring the properties of the living is not the only area affected by the deficiencies of the 
existing scientific language and concepts. A widely known example is also the problem of 
quantum physics undecided about how to classify quantum entities. These manifest a “double” 
nature: they have some properties of “proper”, “normal” particles, but on the other hand they 
also show wave properties (a wave is a pattern of dynamics, a non-material thing). The 
problem was solved by de Brogli through coining the term wave-particle (and an appropriate 
mathematical formalisation – the de Brogli wave equation). Thus physics was forced to 
accept a completely new type of system – a system which remains what it is only so far as it 
keeps doing what it is doing
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. A similar problem was encountered by computer experts who 
solved it in a pragmatic way, by introducing the so-called object-oriented languages in which 
the definition of some of the variables includes also their properties and functions. 
Thus, life is a wave-particle, or rather, a structure-process. A living system remains alive as 
long as it has this double nature – “double” only from the point of view of the linear 
analytical-reductionist thinking. From a cybernetic point of view, the structure-process is a 
basic unit. And the conclusion from chapter two applies to it: if we “cut” it, the creative circle 
is broken and with that the domain it used to create is lost. 
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The above insight also suggests that life is a continuous process that cannot be interrupted. 
Thus, “turned off” living systems are the impossibility. 
AUTOPOIESIS 
It is quite obvious that the standard (scientific) vocabulary does not include an appropriate 
term for describing the imperfective process of searching for equilibrium or negotiating. 
There is also no model available to account for such processes. Let us take a look at what can 
actually be stated about them: 
Since we are dealing with a repetitive process “curved on itself” it is safe to assume that there 
is recursion involved at some point. In the language of cybernetics, one could say that we are 
dealing with a self-regulatory system with a feedback mechanism. The big question is, of 
course, what are the elements of this mechanism and mostly – what is the essential variable 
preserved by the system. In the case of living beings, this feedback mechanism cannot be 
considered to have been “programmed” from the outside in order to regulate a certain 
variable (as in the case of the thermostat – heater system), but a loop functioning 
autonomously. This means it is also independent in “selecting” its manner of functioning. 
This is exactly what Maturana and Varela had in mind when coining the term autopoiesis to 
describe the essential characteristic of the living. Autopoietic systems are those 
(auto-regulatory) systems, which preserve their own auto-regulatory nature. Thus, they do not 
preserve some externally prescribed parameter (e.g. the temperature in a room), but their very 
own manner of functioning. Notions such as “nature” or “manner of functioning” are mere 
approximations and do not describe the essence of autopoietic systems too well. That is why 
Maturana and Varela used the notion of organisation. Autopoietic systems are those, whose 
organisation has the property of preserving itself (auto-poiesis: self-production). 
According to Maturana and Varela, the organisation of the system determines its class 
identity and must remain unchanged if this identity is to be preserved. From the point of view 
of organisation the concrete realisation of the components of the system is of no importance. 
What matters are only the abstract characteristics of the system and relations between them, 
which make this system belongs to a particular class. We can see that for most systems 
organisation is determined from the “outside”, i.e., by the observer. But there is an exception, 
autopoietic systems determining their identity (organisation) by themselves. And this 
self-defining is the source of their autonomy, according to Maturana and Varela. 
BACK TO THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ENTROPY AND THE LIVING 
The autopoietic theory is consistent with Schrödinger‘s thesis of life as that which defies 
entropy. Both theories discuss the living system as a closed system separated from the 
environment by its activity. This activity is self-preservation. While Maturana and Varela 
determine the meaning of this term, they do not explain how the emergence of such a system 
comes about nor what are the elements of the feedback mechanism that keeps living beings 
going in a state far from thermal equilibrium (i.e. maintains their flexibility – openness – 
while at the same time fixes them). I am afraid that also the present article will not solve 
these problems. But it can at least give it a try. 
When talking about the autonomy of living systems that does not mean that a living 
(autopoietic) system could function without the environment. An autopoietic system is 
structurally open and organisationally closed. The above connection between the 
Schrödinger‘s definition and the autopoietic one renders another essential bond between the 
system and environment: the (entropic) dynamics of the environment allows for the 
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autopoietic dynamics of the living system. If we “turn off” entropy, we also turn off the 
conditions for life. 
The state of continuous searching (negotiating) can be reached only through the co-operation of 
two opposing forces. At this point we can think of the numerous examples of “self-propelled” 
feedback systems offered by cyberneticists. 
ARTIFICIAL LIVING SYSTEMS? 
Černigoj 10 defines autopoietic systems as 
“any form of auto-regulation based on auto-regulatory systems, the recursive parameter of which 
is the organisation of the system inside which this auto-regulation takes place”. 
This definition emphasises the ability of the systems in question to dynamically change their 
own structure and with it also the auto-regulatory mechanisms (which are considered to be 
something static, what in the language of cognitive science would be designated as 
hard-wired). According to Černigoj, auto-regulatory processes allow for the self-organisation 
of the system and with this also for its non-trivial adaptation to the environment. This implies 
that the system is capable of creating novelties through which it can adapt even to unpredicted 
changes in the environment (which is non-trivial itself!). An auto-regulatory system that 
could balance the states of its recursive parameters exclusively by auto-regulatory mechanisms 
would be, by definition, incapable of such adaptation, since the essence of auto-regulatory 
mechanisms lies in the fact that they are based on pre-existing arrangements. Auto-regulatory 
mechanisms can compensate only for the disturbances the compensating of which they were 
intended for (when speaking of man-made auto-regulatory mechanisms) or those to which 
they are adapted (when speaking of naturally evolved auto-regulatory mechanisms). But we 
should keep in mind that from the point of view of an individual organism these adaptations 
exist as predetermined biological facts, whose philogenetic development is possible only due 
to the auto-regulatory processes working in the background. 
In other words, the autopoietic organisation enables the system to change the strategies of its 
functioning. This is possible because the only constant in an autopoietic system is its 
organisation (i.e. its capability for preserving its capability of preserving its capability of 
preserving…). As long as this goes on, the system can change its structure and manners of 
functioning. An autopoietic system has no other “task” but to preserve its organisation. Its 
behaviour is of a negotiating character; one could say that given segments (bodily or temporal) 
of its being perform certain tasks, but if we look at it as a whole, we see that their only “task” 
is to endure. There is no way of telling if autopoietic systems have any other task (or if they 
are saving particular “problems”, as can often be heard in the field of artificial intelligence). 
This fact has far-reaching implications. Understood this way, the notion of autopoiesis 
implies that it is impossible to artificially create a system embodying this type of 
organisation! How are we supposed to design a robot or a computer programme whose only 
duty is the preservation of its preservation of its preservation…? (The task of a robot is 
always to fulfil the orders of its programmer.) It is a big mistake on the part of the researchers 
of artificial intelligence and artificial life to set their systems inside a trivial environment
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, an 
entropy-free environment (usually, that is some sort of a virtual world in a computer). As we 
have seen, entropy is not an enemy to life but rather a stimulus allowing for its constant 
battle, constant search for new forms of auto-regulation and adaptation (the task of which is 
again searching for new ways…). Entropy would represent an “enemy” or a problem to be 
“solved” only in case if life were a perfectly linear thing (in which case the solution would be 
quite simple. We could, for example, make a simple vacuum container, put a stone inside it 
U. Kordeš 
24 
and we would thus have made a system capable of defying entropy changes for a very long 
time). Fortunately, it is not so. Entropy or the imminent danger of decomposition, of death, of 
the termination of the autopoietic organisation is, so to speak, a necessary condition for the 
preservation of life. 
It would appear that entropy in some way exists on a similar level as life itself – on the level 
of gestalt. Let us consider the following: (just like life) entropy as such cannot be modelled. 
We can model, for example, gas diffusion, we can model random increase of disorder etc. 
But the very essence of entropy is impossible to grasp. From this point of view, it would 
appear that life and entropy go hand in hand at some invisible level, only the reflections of 
which are visible to the scientific eye. 
Thus, artificial systems are not located in an entropic environment. The first thing that comes 
to mind is, of course: then let us build an entropic environment and set our “living” software 
inside it. But as mentioned above, it is not as simple as that. It seems that building an 
artificial entropic system is just as complicated as building an artificial living system. As I 
mentioned before: we are able to model some of the effects of entropy, just as we are able to 
model certain processes of life. Thus, we are able to counterfeit the appearance, but not the 
autopoietic organisation itself. This mistaking of the appearance (of the structure) for its 
organisation (identity) is called the “PacMan sindrome” by Riegler 11. Programmers, who 
want to create conditions as “natural” as possible for their artificial agents, tend to build 
a priori determined concepts into them. Artificial agents thus enter into interactions with 
man-determined entities such as “food” and “enemy”, who make sense only to the 
programmer of the system. Doing so, they ignore questions like: How did the organisms get 
the idea that a given type of entity represents food? How can they “know” that some other 
being is a dangerous opponent? Beasts do not come equipped with little signs saying “I am 
your enemy”. And even if they did – how could cognitive beings manage to learn to 
understand the meanings of such signs? Autopoietic systems create system-independent inner 
states or “meanings”. But artificial systems are unable to create their meanings. 
Another possible solution would be to expose our programme (or robot) to real/natural entropy. 
And here is where we notice the disadvantages of Schrödinger's definition and the advantages 
of the one formulated by Maturana and Varela. Maybe we could create an autonomous agent 
capable of changing its parts once they malfunctioned. But this would still not mean that we 
are dealing with a living system. It would still be a robot given a particular task (set by the 
programmer!). By its functioning it would not constitute itself as an ontologically separate unit. 
Living systems are autopoietic, meaning that they keep constituting themselves – not only in 
the physical sense but also in the sense of constituting themselves as ontological categories 
which get separated from the rest of the world exactly because of this self-constitution. Living 
systems preserve their organisation, but organisation cannot exist without a structure to be 
embodied in (this is what I was trying to point out when mentioning the “double view”). 
Entropy presents a constant threat to this structure and thus provides an opportunity for the 
autopoietic organisation to get realised. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me try to give a conclusion based on what was said previously: 
Living systems must function in a non-trivial (entropic) environment. Non-triviality of the 
environment is a necessary condition for preserving the negotiating nature of 
living/autopoietic systems. 
Entropy – our best friend 
25 
Entropy allows for a constant dynamics of living systems, the existence of which is obvious 
just as long as they remain active. A constant threat of decomposition, chaos and destruction 
is what keeps us going. We fight against them all our lives, but nevertheless they are our best 
friends. They are our allies making our existence possible, for this never-ending battle is just 
what life actually is. 
REMARKS 
1
One of exceptions is perhaps Dawkins who tries to combine both aspects in his theory of the selfish 
gene and severe criticism of non-evolutionary conceptions. 
2An alternative term would also be „striving“. 
3
Let us consider the possibility that what was said in the above paragraph is wrong and we could make 
an artificial living being. Can you imagine switching such a creature off (just for the night, not to spend 
too much energy)? 
4Whenever they can, physicists still talk about the “double” nature of “particles” and they are still 
irritated by the fact that they are unable to determine exactly both the position (a quantity defining the 
physical component) and the speed (defining the “kinetic” component) of such particles. 
5
A mistake also made by Varela who claimed that his cellular automata programmes, that simulated the 
organisational closure, were autopoietic systems. 
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SAŽETAK 
U radu je naznačeno pitanje povezanosti entropije i života. Definicije života kao pojave koja proturiječi entropiji 
su analizirane. Zaključeno je da je život na određeni način ovisan o entropiji – jer bez nje ne bi mogao 
postaojati. Entropija poprima značenje vrste medija, plodnog tla, koje omogućuje razvoj života. Članak završava 
prezentiranjem dijela posljedica za područje umjetne inteligencije. 
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